In a significant policy shift, the United States has begun opening its doors to foreign shipbuilders to design and construct warships. This move, formalized in a recent presidential memorandum titled ‘Rebuilding the United States Navy and America’s Shipbuilding Industrial Base,’ aims to address a growing crisis in domestic naval capacity by prioritizing investment in shipyards, the workforce, and supply chain infrastructure.
The urgency behind this decision is underscored by stark fleet statistics. As of May 2026, the US Navy operated 291 battle-force ships. In contrast, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) maintained an active fleet of 1,005 vessels as of August 2026, according to globalmilitary.net. This widening gap has become a primary concern for American naval planners, who must balance the need for a global presence with the requirement to prepare for potential high-intensity conflict.
Richard Thomas, editor-in-chief of GlobalData’s defence desk, noted that while the US maintains a qualitative edge, that advantage is eroding annually. He described the current state of the US surface combatant fleet as “extremely serious,” citing persistent failures in the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and Constellation-class programmes. Thomas emphasized that simply increasing budget allocations will not resolve the fundamental issues, which include a lack of skilled labor, maintenance backlogs, and inefficient procurement procedures.
The disparity extends beyond military vessels into the commercial sector. In 2025, Chinese shipyards accounted for 53 percent of global commercial shipping output, a massive increase from less than 5 percent in 2000. Conversely, the US share of the sector has plummeted, falling to 0.11 percent in 2024 and reaching virtually zero in 2025. While commercial capacity does not equate directly to military output, it provides a critical industrial foundation that the US currently lacks.
Mehmet Ozkan, a professor at the Joint War Institute of Türkiye’s National Defence University, argued that reestablishing this industrial depth is a multi-year endeavor. “Although money is beneficial, the process of reestablishing industrial capacity necessitates years,” Ozkan explained. He warned that while the US holds advantages in nuclear submarines, carrier aviation, and operational experience, China’s expansive shipbuilding base provides a decisive edge in the event of a protracted war.
The challenge is compounded by the US Navy’s need to manage multiple global theaters simultaneously. The recent redirection of assets toward West Asia, such as the deployment of the USS Abraham Lincoln for 274 days and its subsequent replacement by the USS George Washington, has highlighted the difficulty of sustaining high-priority operations. Analysts point to the US network of capable allies in the Indo-Pacific as a vital “differentiator” that could provide Washington the time needed to revitalize its industrial base.
However, some experts question whether the focus on total fleet numbers is the most accurate metric for success. Josef Gregory Mahoney, a professor at East China Normal University, suggested that the premise of a long, high-intensity surface war fought near the Chinese mainland is questionable. China has invested heavily in anti-access and area-denial capabilities, such as anti-ship missiles and submarines, designed to deter large-scale US operations near its coast.
Ultimately, the debate centers on “sustainable deployable combat power”—the actual ability to keep ships in the fight rather than waiting for repairs. While China’s industrial advantage would be a significant factor in a prolonged war of attrition, Thomas noted that such a conflict between the two powers would be catastrophic. For now, Washington is betting that a combination of foreign partnerships and domestic industrial reform will be enough to maintain its strategic standing in an increasingly competitive maritime environment. The report also notes that while China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) operates over 1,000 – 1,005 to be precise – active vessels as of August 2026, according to globalmilitary.ne t, the US Navy had 291 battle-force ships as of May 2026. The report also notes that china’s commercial capacity does not translate directly into military capability — advanced nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers require specialised facilities and technologies — but it gives Beijing a much larger ecosystem for producing ships, components and maritime equipment. The report also notes that the problem is that the weakness has developed over decades. The report also notes that uS government assessments have repeatedly identified delays and cost increases in naval shipbuilding. The report also notes that arguing that delivery of Virginia-class attack submarines and Arleigh Burke Flight III destroyers would be crucial to the US Navy’s ability to counter China, he also highlighted pressure on submarine production. The report also notes that “Increases in the budget will not suffice to resolve these severe concerns,” he said. The report also notes that that creates a difficult mismatch for Washington. The report also notes that that distinction matters because a large fleet is of limited value if vessels spend extended periods waiting for repairs or replacements.
Source: TRT World
